Richard Holden

Future Fellow (ARC)
Journal articles
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Holden R; Keane M; Lilley M, 2021, 'Peer effects on the United States Supreme Court', Quantitative Economics, vol. 12, pp. 981 - 1019, http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/QE1296
2021
Bhatt R; Dechter E; Holden R, 2020, 'Registration Costs and Voter Turnout', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 176, pp. 191 - 104, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.04.017
2020
Edmond C; Holden R; Preston B, 2020, 'Should We Worry about Government Debt? Thoughts on Australia's COVID-19 Response', AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, vol. 53, pp. 557 - 565, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8462.12402
2020
Friedman JN; Holden R, 2020, 'Optimal Gerrymandering in a competitive environment', Economic Theory Bulletin, vol. 8, pp. 347 - 367, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40505-020-00188-3
2020
Akerlof R; Holden R, 2019, 'Capital Assembly', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 35, pp. 489 - 512, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewz012
2019
Holden R, 2018, 'Competitive neutrality in industry equilibrium', Competition and Consumer Law Journal, vol. 25, pp. 267 - 279, https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/8939d90e-aa49-47fd-8ebd-c9bd09c553ac/?context=1201008&federationidp=TNCHFB52729
2018
Holden R; Aghion P; Fehr E; Wilkening T, 2018, 'The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation', Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 16, pp. 232 - 274, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvx026
2018
Ederer F; Holden R; Meyer M, 2018, 'Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision', RAND Journal of Economics, pp. 819 - 854, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12253
2018
Holden R; Gratton G; Kolotilin A, 2018, 'When to Drop a Bombshell', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 85, pp. 2139 - 2172, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx070
2018
Holden R, 2017, 'A nobel prize for property rights theory', Games, vol. 8, http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g8010004
2017
Holden R; Holden RT, 2016, 'Voting and Elections: New Social Science Perspectives', Annual Review of Law and Social Science, vol. 12, pp. 255 - 272, http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110615-084704
2016
Akerlof R; Holden R, 2016, 'Movers and Shakers', QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, vol. 131, pp. 1849 - 1874, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw021
2016
Kartik N; Tercieux O; Holden R, 2014, 'Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 83, pp. 284 - 290, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011
2014
Hummel P; Holden R, 2014, 'Optimal primaries', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 109, pp. 64 - 75, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.10.001
2014
Holden RT; Malani A, 2014, 'Renegotiation Design by Contract', University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 81, pp. 151 - 178, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles/3991/
2014
Ellison G; Holden R, 2013, 'A Theory of Rule Development', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 30, pp. 649 - 682, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewt016
2013
Gibbons R; Holden R; Powell M, 2012, 'Organization and Information: Firms’ Governance Choices in Rational-Expectations Equilibrium*', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 127, pp. 1813 - 1841, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs033
2012
Aghion P; Fudenberg D; Holden R; Kunimoto T; Tercieux O, 2012, 'Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 127, pp. 1843 - 1881, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs026
2012
Akerlof RJ; Holden RT, 2012, 'The nature of tournaments', Economic Theory, vol. 51, pp. 289 - 313, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0523-4
2012
Holden RT; Cox A, 2011, 'Rethinking Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering', University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 78, pp. 553 - 604, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1248&context=public_law_and_legal_theory
2011
Aghion P; Holden R, 2011, 'Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?', Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 25, pp. 181 - 197, http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.2.181
2011
Fryer R; Holden R, 2011, 'Measuring the compactness of political districting plans', Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 54, pp. 493 - 535, http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/661511
2011
Friedman JN; Holden RT, 2009, 'The Rising Incumbent Reelection Rate: What's Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?*', The Journal of Politics, vol. 71, pp. 593 - 593, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609090483
2009
Friedman JN; Holden RT, 2008, 'Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, But Never Crack', American Economic Review, vol. 98, pp. 113 - 144, http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.113
2008
Holden RT, 2005, 'The Original Management Incentive Schemes', Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 19, pp. 135 - 144, http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533005775196688
2005
Working Papers
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Dobrescu I; Holden R; Motta A; Wong C, 2019, Fun in Education, http://dx.doi.org
2019
Aghion P; Fehr E; Holden R; Wilkening T, The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation, http://dx.doi.orghttp://ftp.iza.org/dp8971.pdf
Aghion P; Fudenberg D; Holden R; Kunimoto T; Tercieux O, Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations, http://dx.doi.org
Kartik N; Tercieux O; Holden R, Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty, http://dx.doi.org
Reports
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Dixon R; Holden R, 2018, A Climate Dividend for Australians, UNSW, Sydney
2018
Gratton G; Holden R; Kolotilin A, Timing Information Flows, http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/richardholden/assets/ghk_v23-aer.pdf
Book Chapters
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Holden RT, 2017, 'A Process for Non-Partisan Redistricting', in Tabor J (ed.), An Illinois Constitution for the 21st Century, Illinois Policy Institute, Chicago, pp. 101 - 124
2017
Holden RT, 2016, 'Law and Economics', in The Critical Judgments Project Re-Reading Monis V the Queen
2016
Holden RT, 2015, 'Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism Design', in The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics, Oxford University Press, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-impact-of-incomplete-contracts-on-economics-9780199826223?cc=au&lang=en&#
2015
Dixon RJ; Holden R, 2012, 'Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem', in Ginsburg T (ed.), Comparative Constitutional Design, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 195 - 218, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139105712.011
2012

Contract theory, law and economics, and political ec​onomy.

Gratton G; Holden R, 2018, Can Australia avoid Europe’s populist fate?
2018
Gratton G; Holden R, 2017, Labor Should Take Heed
2017
Milas C; Kyris G; Arvanitakis J; Fotaki M; Papastergiadis N; Davison R; Holden R; Buckley R; Vasilopoulou S, 2015, Greece votes No: Experts respond, https://theconversation.com/greece-votes-no-experts-respond-44231
2015